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WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN? HOW PROSECUTORS
FAIL TO PROTECT CITIZENS FROM POLICE VIOLENCE
Joshua Hegarty
I.

INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors are arguably the most powerful agents of the criminal justice

system. It is not an uncommon sentiment expressed within the legal community,
whether for law students, practicing attorneys, and former prosecutors, that it is a
position for attorneys who play to win. Prosecutors often do win, but in large part,
it is because their discretion allows them to set the rules.
While judges typically are afforded discretion in sentencing, their hands
can be, and often are, bound by mandatory sentencing legislation. Police officers
have similarly been granted broad discretion under 4th Amendment jurisprudence,
however, this discretion can be tempered by prosecutors, with their choices on
who to charge, for what crimes, and in the event of trial, what evidence to present.
Prosecutors gain their power from their broad discretion, specifically with respect
to who to charge with crimes. While prosecutorial discretion is a useful and very
important tool, it is so broad as to open the door for prosecutors to act against the
public good, whether through biased, discriminatory, or political exercise of their
discretion. Legal attacks levied against prosecutors on the basis of discriminatory
prosecution have largely resulted in further shielding of prosecutors and creating
incredibly high standards of proof to show misconduct.
The likelihood of political decisions is especially apparent when citizens
accuse police officers of crimes and when citizens are killed by police officers, or
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otherwise wind up dead in police custody. In nearly all jurisdictions in the United
States, chief prosecutors are elected officials. 1 As such, all of their prosecutorial
decisions, along with the general policies imposed upon the prosecutors working
beneath them, have some basis in politicizing, as there are certainly instances
where the pubic good may be different than what the public perceives to be good.
When police officers are accused of crimes, this problem is exasperated.
Prosecutors rely upon the cooperation of police departments to do their job and
the voting public tends to respect and believe the police. Short of overwhelmingly
clear evidence of unwarranted violence by a police officer, even charging a police
officer with a crime may have tremendous political backlash for a prosecutor.
In the past, events of police violence were more easily brushed off as
intermittent, rather than epidemic. But because of new media and new technology,
it is clear that citizens are killed by police officers at alarming rates across the
country despite the fact that on the job police deaths appear to be on the decline.
Even more alarming is the lack of indictments against those police officers, even
in circumstances when unarmed people are handled with lethal force. Even when
officers are indicted, they are rarely convicted, and when convicted, significantly
less likely than the general population to spend time incarcerated.
Whatever the reason for this failure to indict, it sends a message to our
police officers in that their power is not being restricted and that they are allowed
to use lethal force when non-lethal force, or even no force at all, might suffice.
1

This is not the case for Federal Prosecutors, as they are appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate. Amongst the states, only Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey select their chief
prosecutors through gubernational appointment. In all other states, the chief prosecutor, whether
known as the “District Attorney,” “County Attorney,” or some other title, is elected by popular
ballot.
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America’s prosecutors are clearly not even attempting to hold police officers
accountable for lives of the people that they kill and do not even appear to pretend
that they are doing so. Because of this, we need to implement a system by which
independent offices, not dependent upon police cooperation, and not subject to
replacement by public opinion, would be tasked with investigating and
prosecuting police officers accused of crimes.

II.

THE VALUE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Discretion is the chief tool prosecutors use in exercising their duty to seek

justice as it allows prosecutors to act with the special insight granted by their
position. In fact, despite the windows it opens for abuse of the justice system,
prosecutorial discretion is necessary for the criminal justice system to function at
all, for several reasons. First, while sentencing guidelines and criminal statutes do
not always allow for circumstances to mitigate a perpetrator’s sentence when
appropriate, a prosecutor can always elect to forgo charges.2 This allows, although
does not require, the justice system to treat defendants as individuals in ways that
are not always otherwise available. Some would argue that prosecutors can, and
should, be among the chief agents in reforming the criminal justice system,
specifically because of the powers afforded by discretion.3 The possibility of
over-criminalization, that is lawmakers crafting criminal statutes that either
criminalize behavior that does not harm society, or otherwise using terms that
create overly broad prohibitions, requires an intermediary to prevent the waste of

2

Prosecutorial Misconduct § 4:3 (2d ed.)
See generally K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an
Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 285 (2014).
3
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public resources in enforcing bad laws.4 Prosecutorial discretion is the only
available tool in our criminal justice system that can serve this role. But
ultimately, even if these reasons failed to justify prosecutorial discretion, it would
still be a necessary tool purely on the basis of the sheer volume of crimes that are
committed weighed against the actual, and limited, amount of resources that can
be devoted to law enforcement.5 Governments have limited budgets, and finite
numbers of prosecutors and judges. To remove prosecutorial discretion
completely would have to require that all people arrested or suspected of crimes
must be charged, regardless of factors such as the social harms resulting from the
alleged offense or the amount and nature of evidence that could support a
conviction. Without an agent of government deciding which investigations are
worth carrying out, which charges to consider, and what parties to haul into court,
the criminal justice system would grind to a halt. Abolishing prosecutorial
discretion, therefore, would be entirely unworkable.

III.

THE COSTS OF DISCRETION6
While discretion does have clear benefits for the justice system, it has very

real costs as well. A primary concern is that prosecutors use their discretion is
racially discriminatory ways, and even a cursory glance at the differences in
prison populations between people of color and white people justifies this

4

Prosecutorial Misconduct § 4:3 (2d ed.)
Prosecutorial Misconduct § 4:3 (2d ed.)
6
A major area of debate in relation to prosecutorial discretion is the use of plea bargaining as it
pertains to issues of procedural fairness and the likelihood of innocent people pleading guilty in
order to avoid being found guilty through a potentially unfair trial. There is a considerable body of
scholarship on the topic. Plea bargaining, however, will be largely ignored here, as this Article is
concerned chiefly with charging discretion. When no one is charged, plea bargaining does not
become a relevant issue.
5
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concern.7 Even more concerning is how willing the Supreme Court has been in
protecting prosecutors from claims of discriminatory prosecution, in the process
protecting even further the ability of prosecutors to avoid being scrutinized for
discretionary charges that are not related to a protected status of the charged party.
In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court ruled that the results of the
Baldus Study could not support a finding that any specific defendant was
discriminated against in sentencing.8 The study showed a high correlation existed
within the state of Georgia between the races of criminal defendants and their
victims, and the likelihood of a defendant being convicted and sentenced to death.
The findings suggested that racial discrimination in prosecution and sentencing
had led to a disproportionate amount of black defendants being sentenced to
death, and even more so when accused of killing white people. This decision is
most notably remembered as establishing that racial discrimination within the
justice system must be established by very specific evidence, and that is why it
can be found in Criminal Law and Constitutional Law textbooks. However, it also
stands for the, potentially equally important, proposition that judicial and
prosecutorial discretion are “firmly entrenched in American law,” and, as such,
“are final and unreviewable.”9 There is simply no room within the justice system
for any party to review the decisions of a prosecutor to charge anyone with a
7

It demands noting that while this Article is focused on police misconduct and violence, it is not
written as an attempt to explore deeper racial biases in the American justice system, and as such is
written in what amounts to racially neutral language. This is not, by any means, an attempt to
ignore that police violence and other misconduct is suffered in disproportionate amounts by people
of color. The issue of reducing police violence is, to this author’s mind, one of the very few
racialized problems in the justice system that may be solvable through racially neutral solutions.
For a very full examination of systematic racism and biases in the criminal justice system, see
Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow.
8
481 U.S. 279, (1987)
9
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311-12, (1987)
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crime unless that review is based upon claims of unlawful discrimination. The
corollary goes unsaid: there is nothing that can be done when a prosecutor fails to
bring charges despite the arguable existence of probable cause. This is the
problem inherent with the ways that prosecutors treat police officers; there just is
no recourse to seek justice for the families of those killed by police officers,
except for trying to convince a prosecutor to change his mind. While political
pressure, in theory, could lead to such a change in opinion, it is not as if elections
happen on demand. The more likely result of political pressure to bring charges is
that grand jury will be called. This poses a very specific problem that will be
explained in greater detail below.
In 1996, the Supreme Court elected to further shield prosecutorial
discretion in United States v. Armstrong, where it held that discovery that could
show discrimination in charging can only be obtained by, essentially, proving the
very discrimination that the discovery would show.10 The prosecutor in
Armstrong was accused of racially discriminating in charging decisions, and, so,
the defendant attempted to gain discovery to show that the prosecutor could have
charged similarly situated people of different races, but elected not to do so.
While such a standard to prevail appears reasonable and well in line with
McCleskey, the problem is that the McCleskey standard has become the same one
to be applied for discovery of the very documents that most likely satisfy the
burden of proof. That is, in order to obtain discovery of documents to help plead a
case of racial discrimination in prosecution, very specific evidence of actual racial
discrimination in the very prosecution being targeted must be provided. This
10

517 U.S. 456, (1996)
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decision effectively allows prosecutors to discriminate in charging because of the
nigh impossibility of proving such discrimination. But, it also serves to heighten
the protections afforded to the decisions of prosecutors. Because discovery is so
heavily guarded, and because there are no classes afforded special protection
against discrimination related to whether or not a person is a police officer, there
is nothing to prevent a prosecutor from simply deciding to never charge police
officers with crimes.
These decisions support the notion that prosecutors have essentially
unfettered discretion. Their decisions are shielded from review and can be made
for any reason, so long as they cannot be shown to be discrimination based upon a
legally protected status of a charged defendant. While raising obvious issues
about racial discrimination in prosecution, these protections also allow for other
arbitrary, personal, professional, or political reasons to factor into the decisions of
prosecutors. With no oversight, and no requirements to charge any particular
individuals, prosecutors have been allowed to do as they please, without penalty,
except under egregious circumstances.
When charges are shown to have am illegal and discriminatory basis, they
can be thrown out.11 While showing such discrimination proves to be a
considerable burden, the remedy of having charges dropped reflects a clear legal
policy: it is a recognition that unlawful discrimination is so harmful that the
justice system would rather dismiss charges when probable cause might exist,
then to allow discrimination to affect charging decisions.
11

Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68
Fordham L. Rev. 1511, 1518 (2000)

312

Vol. 37.1

Ethical guidelines do, sometimes, exist, which mean to control the ways in
which prosecutors exercise their discretion. However, many, such as those
provided by the Department of Justice, and are expected to apply to federal
prosecutors, are exactly that, guidelines. They are not enforceable by law. 12
The issues commonly raised in discussions about prosecutorial discretion
tend to focus on discrimination related to defendants who have been charged with
a crime. What is not often discussed is the issue of a failure to bring charges. Only
legislative action could correct this. Of course, for the reasons explained above,
prosecutors could not be required to charge all persons for whom probable cause
existed.13 The result would simply exhaust government resources, or else be
ignored by prosecutors as overzealous legislation. To be enforceable, rules
regulating mandatory prosecution would have to differ from the ethical guidelines
that currently exist, and in so doing create either a private right of action or else a
mandatory review of decisions not charge from an independent source. Either
type of enforcement would be unworkable. A private right of action would either
grant unlimited standing, such that any person could petition the government to
bring charges against any person, or else it would have to limit standing in ways
that would be inherently arbitrary, that would, at times, grant no person standing.
Independent review would be an administrative quagmire, as it would necessarily
require prosecutors to conduct investigation into all potential crimes, and then to
present their findings before independent review boards. It is certainly a
miscarriage of justice for a person to escape criminal charges solely because the
12

Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68
Fordham L. Rev. 1511, 1512 (2000)
13
Prosecutorial Misconduct § 4:3 (2d ed.)
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relevant prosecutor’s office declines to charge that person. Yet, the very nature,
and necessity, of discretion precludes the possibility of mandatory charging.

IV.

THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF GRAND JURIES14
Grand juries pose a particularly interesting, and political, role for

prosecutors. While the 5th Amendment requires the use of grand juries in the
process of prosecution for federal crimes, in State jurisdictions, procedures can
vary. In most jurisdictions, prosecutors have the option of either bringing a case
before a grand jury or before a judge in a preliminary hearing. 15 The purpose of
either is the same, to determine if probable cause exists to support charges against
an accused person. In the 2009-2010 year, federal prosecutors attempted to
prosecute more than 150,000 defendants, and in only 11 of these cases did a grand
jury fail to indict the accused.16 This is not a coincidence. In a very real sense, a
grand jury’s job is to indict, and return a “true bill,” which a prosecutor uses to
move forward with charging. Prosecutors have discretion in deciding what cases
to present before a grand jury, and will typically decline to do so unless they
expect an indictment.
While a prosecutor is not necessarily bound by the decision of a grand
jury, and can elect to not charge a person who has been indicted, or can attempt to
prove probable cause in a hearing after a grand jury does not indict, the grand jury
14

While grand juries predate the Revolutionary War, and are mentioned in the 5 th Amendment,
they are still a misunderstood process, often omitted from representations of the justice system in
popular media. While they do vary amongst jurisdictions, the process typically involves a
prosecutor presenting evidence and witnesses before a group of citizens who are then tasked with
answering the question of whether or not a crime may have been committed and whether or not
the accused may have committed the crime in question. A unanimous decision is not required and
the standard is far below the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applied in criminal trials.
15
How Does a Grand Jury Work?, FindLaw, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-procedure/howdoes-a-grand-jury-work.html
16
Department of Justice Statistics, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs10st.pdf
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process, in effect, takes the charging decision away from the prosecutor.17 This
process allows a prosecutor to take advantage of the likely outcomes of a grand
jury in order to bring charges or fail to bring charges in a way that can appear
blameless to the public. Because information regarding indictment rates with
grand juries is fairly ascertainable, prosecutors can essentially use the grand jury
process to exercise their charging discretion in a way that serves to insulate them
politically. The process allows prosecutors to not look foolish in bringing charges
after a grand jury votes to indict on what might be flimsy evidence, while also
allowing a prosecutor to look competent and faultless when what might be
substantial evidence fails to sway a grand jury.
The grand jury process has been criticized by some as unnecessary and
outdated, especially given the fact that they are no longer used in England. Some
would also consider it an infringement upon the rights of the accused, as
proceedings are conducted in secret, and the accused has right to confront
witnesses or otherwise inform the jurors of exculpatory evidence.18 In many
proceedings, the only representatives of the justice system present are prosecutors.
There is no judge, and so, instructions of law are given by the very prosecutors
asking for an indictment.19 Jurors are allowed to consider evidence that would not
be admissible at trial, including hearsay, illegally obtained evidence, or even the

17

How Does a Grand Jury Work?, FindLaw, http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-procedure/howdoes-a-grand-jury-work.html
18
Gregory D. Morril, Prosecutorial Investigations Using Grand Jury Reports: Due Process and
Political Accountability Concerns, 44 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 483, 485 (2011)
19
Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L.
Rev. 260, 266 (1995)
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personal opinion of the prosecutor.20 In addition to these potential problems for
the accused, some would argue that these same problems render grand jurors
amongst the least qualified to make decisions to indict.21 Such critics have noted
that the only ways to correct these issues in a grand jury process would be to
make the process more similar to a jury trial, with cross-examination, a
requirement to bring forth exculpatory evidence, and only allowing the
consideration of admissible evidence.22 Rather than make such changes, which
would drastically alter the process itself, some would suggest that the process be
done away with entirely. While this Article is not concerned with the question of
whether grand juries should be abandoned under American law, it will be
addressed below how the many criticisms of the process suggesting that it unfairly
favors indictment can show opposite results when a prosecutor appears to not
desire indictment. It may just as easily serve as a “rubber stamp” as it can a “get
out of jail free card” for both the police and the prosecutor.

V.

POLICE VIOLENCE
Police violence is occurring at epidemic levels and has been since at least

1976. In 1976, the FBI began tracking the number of times in which a police
officer shot and killed someone in the line of duty. Since then, its data suggests

20

Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L.
Rev. 260, 267 (1995)
21
Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L.
Rev. 260 (1995)
22
Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 Cornell L.
Rev. 260 (1995)
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that there has not been a single year with fewer than 300 lethal police shootings.
The highest number the FBI has recorded was 460 fatal police shootings per year.
However, federal officials have admitted this data is largely dependent on the
self-reporting of local police departments, and is consequently, almost certainly
lower than the actual number of lethal police shootings.23 This data, being limited
to lethal police shootings, obviously ignores non-lethal instances of police
violence, data about people who die while in police custody, and instances of
sexual violence by police officers. Because the FBI data’s self-reporting makes
the data unable to accurately document the instances of police related killings, the
Washington Post has elected to undertake its own accounting of lethal police
shootings.24 This data is compiled through tracking localized news reports,
reviewing information compiled by other independent databases and through
additional investigatory reporting.25 This data is similarly limited to the specific
issue of citizens who are shot to death by police in the line of duty. It does not
include instances in which people die in other ways during an encounter with
police, or within police custody. Nor does it include other causes of death, or even
instances of non-lethal violence. It does, however, allow for viewing the data
according to demographics, such as race, age, gender, mental illness, threat level,
and the presence of a weapon.

23

Wesley Lowery, There have been 500 people shot and killed by police in the U.S. so far in 2015
(Jul. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/07/10/there-havebeen-500-people-shot-and-killed-by-police-in-the-u-s-so-far-in-2015/.
24
http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/
25
How The Washington Post is examining police shootings in the U.S., (June 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/how-the-washington-post-is-examining-policeshootings-in-the-us/2015/06/29/f42c10b2-151b-11e5-9518-f9e0a8959f32_story.html
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According to this data, in 2015, 987 people have been shot to death by
police officers in the United States, across every state except for Rhode Island.26
The Washington Post has continued to compile this data into 2016, and as of
January 15, 2016, there have been 24 people shot and killed by police.27
What could be responsible for this rash of killings? Popular opinion would
suggest that the job of a police officer must be increasingly dangerous. Wisconsin
Governor Scott Walker, in an attempt to discredit Barack Obama during his run
for presidency, suggested exactly this: that the number of police officers killed in
the line of duty has increased during Obama’s presidency.28 However, the
opposite has proven true. Police fatalities have been decreasing since Ronald
Reagan’s presidency. Statistics have been compiled with respect to the number of
police fatalities during first seven years of every two term president since, and
including, Reagan. During Reagan’s presidency, there were 576, 528 for Clinton,
and 405 for Bush. As of September 3, 2015, only 314 police officers had died in
the line of duty during Obama’s presidency.29
As of November 15, 2015, only 110 police officers had died in the line of duty.
Of these, only 35 were gun related, down 19% since 2014, while 47 were due to
traffic accidents.30 By the end of 2015, the total amount of police officer fatalities

26

Of these shootings, 38 of the killed were both unarmed and black. Fewer than half of the killed
were white.
27
http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/
28
Jud Lounsbury, Police Fatalities Much Lower Than Under Reagan, Yet Walker Blames Obama,
(Sep. 3, 2015), http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/09/188286/police-fatalities-much-lowerunder-reagan-yet-walker-blames-obama
29
Jud Lounsbury, Police Fatalities Much Lower Than Under Reagan, Yet Walker Blames Obama,
(Sep. 3, 2015), http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/09/188286/police-fatalities-much-lowerunder-reagan-yet-walker-blames-obama
30
National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/officerfatalities-data
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totaled fewer than 130, with some apparent discrepancy in the numbers reported
by the Officer Down Memorial Page, reporting 129, and the National Law
Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, reporting 124.3132 Despite the 24 reported
deaths caused by police shootings so far in 2016, neither organization currently
reports any police officers having died as of January 15, 2016. The NLEOMF has
also compiled statistics to provide a year by year comparison of the number of
police officers killed, which does show a slight increase since 2013, but also
shows a dramatic decrease since the 1970s, which had a spike of 280 officers
killed in 1974.33 While there is no record of those killed by police as
comprehensive as that put together by the Washington Post for this time period,
there is the admittedly incomplete record from the FBI, which indicates a general
range of 300-450 people killed by police gunfire every year since 1976, rising and
falling with peaks in 1976, 1993 and 2013.34 While police fatalities have
decreased over 40 years, citizen fatalities by police have, in the best case, stayed
consistent, and in the worst case, increased.
So, while it is clear that the job of a police officer is inherently dangerous,
it is not as apparent that the profession is increasingly lethal. In fact, the amount
of danger inherent in being a police officer has decreased so much that, according
to Department of Labor statistics, the job of police officer is only the 18th most

31

Officer Down Memorial Page, https://www.odmp.org/search/year?year=2015
National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/recentlyfallen/recently-fallen-2015/?referrer=http://www.nleomf.org/facts/recently-fallen/
33
National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/researchbulletins/
34
Wesley Lowery, There have been 500 people shot and killed by police in the U.S. so far in 2015
(Jul. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/07/10/there-havebeen-500-people-shot-and-killed-by-police-in-the-u-s-so-far-in-2015/.
32
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dangerous job in the United States.35 It lags behind loggers, fishers, garbage
collectors, taxi drivers, and bartenders. This Article does not seek to answer the
question of why lethal police shootings have been on the rise, but the cause surely
is not an increase in the amount of police fatalities.36 While there is a minor
increase over the past few years, this is part of a heavy decline since 1976. In fact,
some have considered this data with respect to the United States population over
time in order to develop a metric to measure the safety of police officers. 37 Under
this analysis, despite the uptick in sheer numbers of police deaths from 2013 to
2015, 2015 would be considered the second safest year for police officers in the
entire history of the United States, with a rate of 0.112 gun-related deaths per onemillion people.38 Police are becoming safer while the citizenry is not.

VI.

POLICE INDICTMENTS, CONVICTIONS, &
INCARCERATION
The rates at which grand juries vote to indict police officers is alarming

when compared to rates of non-police officers who are indicted by grand jury. As
mentioned above, in the 2009-2010 year, only 11 grand juries related to federal

35 Gwynn Guilford, Garbage collectors are more likely to die on the job than police patrol
officers, (May 24, 2015), http://qz.com/410585/garbage-collectors-are-more-likely-to-die-on-thejob-than-police-patrol-officers/
36
Again, this Author would recommend Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow to help provide,
at least, a partial answer to this question as it pertains to a combination of policing done for profit,
racial profiling in police work, harmful drug policies, and the militarization of the police.
37
Radley Balko, In the end, 2015 saw no ‘war on cops’ and no ‘national crime wave’, (Dec. 22,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/12/22/in-the-end-2015-saw-nowar-on-cops-and-no-national-crime-wave/
38
Radley Balko, In the end, 2015 saw no ‘war on cops’ and no ‘national crime wave’, (Dec. 22,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/12/22/in-the-end-2015-saw-nowar-on-cops-and-no-national-crime-wave/
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prosecutions did not indict out of more than 150,000 potential prosecutions.39
During the 7 year period of 2004-2011, the FBI investigated 2,718 incidents in
which a police officer killed someone in the line of duty. Over this same 7 year
period, only 41 police officers were charged with manslaughter or murder because
of these incidents.40 The Cato Institute tracked allegations of police misconduct
involving almost 11,000 police officers from April 2009 through December 2010.
Of these, less than a third resulted in criminal charges, and of these charged, less
than a third led to a conviction.41 While these raw pieces of data obviously cannot
include significant information about the specific nature of any of these incidents,
they demonstrate, but do not explain, a very simple truth: police officers are
almost never charged with crimes.
What could be the reason for this? The grand jury process is almost
certainly a part of it. As indicated earlier, the purpose of grand juries is to indict.
Former New York State Chief Judge Sol Wachtler once remarked that a
prosecutor could persuade a grand jury to “indict a ham sandwich.”42 Is this is the
case, then, why can prosecutors not persuade grand juries to indict police officers?
Perhaps, it is because of the unspoken corollary. If a prosecutor can convince a
jury to indict a ham sandwich, why would a prosecutor not be able to convince a
jury that the same ham sandwich committed no crime? A grand jury will decline
39

Department of Justice Statistics, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs10st.pdf
Zusha Elinson and Joe Palazzolo, Police Rarely Criminally Charged for On-Duty Shootings,
(Nov. 24, 2014, 7:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/police-rarely-criminally-charged-for-onduty-shootings-1416874955
41
Zusha Elinson and Joe Palazzolo, Police Rarely Criminally Charged for On-Duty Shootings,
(Nov. 24, 2014, 7:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/police-rarely-criminally-charged-for-onduty-shootings-1416874955
42
Ben Casselman, It’s Incredibly Rare For A Grand Jury To Do What Ferguson’s Just Did,
(Nov. 24, 2014, 9:30 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/ferguson-michael-brown-indictmentdarren-wilson/
40
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to indict if a prosecutor appears to desire that outcome, “thereby absolving the
prosecutor from making a difficult political decision and leaving responsibility
with the grand jury.”43
A look at the grand jury held in St. Louis County in relation to the killing
of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri may shed some light on the matter.
Transcripts from this grand jury show that the prosecutors cross-examined its own
potential witnesses, which is highly unusual, since grand juries are led by the
prosecutor and for the purpose of finding support for prosecution.44 Darren
Wilson, however, the would-be defendant, was not cross-examined and delivered
four hours of testimony. During the process, the grand jury received inaccurate
information suggesting that a police officer is allowed to shoot and kill a fleeing
suspect, regardless whether or not that police officer feared the decedent. While
this was corrected, it was weeks into the process. The transcripts were then
released to the public, which is unusual when considering that grand jurors are
sworn to secrecy. This is especially strange because in Missouri, it is a crime for a
grand juror to release such information.
Another more recent example of strange behavior from a prosecutor
during a grand jury comes from the process surrounding the lack of indictment of
Timothy Loehmann and Frank Garmback in relation to the November 2014
shooting of Tamir Rice. The shooting was caught on camera, and video is widely
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available on the internet. In it, Rice can be seen in a park holding a pellet gun.45
Some time later, he is seen sitting on a bench in the same park, as a police cruiser
pulls up next to him, within the park. As the officers exit the car, Rice’s body can
be seen falling, having been shot.
More than a year later, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, Timothy McGinty,
concluded the grand jury, and when it was over, there was no indictment. One
might wonder how this can be, considering that Rice was twelve years old at the
time, and because of how suddenly after arriving upon the scene, the police
opened fire. Why was there no indictment of either Loehmann or Garmback here?
Because McGinty recommended to the grand jury that they should not indict
either police officer.46 In addition to his recommendation, McGinty and his office
provided three separate reports declaring the shooting appropriate from experts,
the type of which might be procured by a defense attorney in a criminal
proceeding. In a press conference announcing the results of the grand jury,
McGinty said “We don’t second guess police officers.”47 Essentially, McGinty
wanted the grand jury to believe that Rice reached for the pellet gun, which the
officers were to have reasonably mistaken for a real gun, and then opened fire.
What this ignores, however, is that when the police were called on Rice, dispatch
was told that the gun was likely not real, and that the police dispatch failed to
provide this information to the officers who arrived on scene. This story also
45
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ignores the notion of “Officer-Created Jeopardy,” which is a term describing
events in which police officers act carelessly, thereby creating a dangerous
situation, resulting in the use of force for protection.48 Operating on the
assumption that Rice was brandishing a real gun and potentially dangerous, as
police calls had indicated Rice had pointed it at passersby, the officers made a
tactical error by choosing to approach Rice by bringing the cruiser within point
blank shooting range of Rice. Doing so put the officers into a compromised
position because, were the gun real, Rice would have been able to open fire
almost immediately upon the officers, which in turn created the fear, that
McGinty believed justified the shooting of Rice. McGinty could have done
differently, and could have used this officer created jeopardy as a basis for
criminality, arguing that because they were unreasonable in creating a dangerous
situation without cause, they are not protected from guilt and punishment for the
consequences of that initial reckless action.49 Whether or not this would have
been a winning strategy in court, the choice not to employ it is telling, because it
is the choice to allow police more power over civilians, rather than to attempt to
diminish police power.

48

Leon Neyfakh, Tamir Rice’s Death Resulted From “Officer-Created Jeapordy.” So Why Were
No Officers Indicted?, (Dec. 28, 2015.),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/12/28/tamir_rice_s_death_didn_t_lead_to_indictmen
ts_because_of_supreme_court_vagueness.html
49
Leon Neyfakh, Tamir Rice’s Death Resulted From “Officer-Created Jeapordy.” So Why Were
No Officers Indicted?, (Dec. 28, 2015.),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/12/28/tamir_rice_s_death_didn_t_lead_to_indictmen
ts_because_of_supreme_court_vagueness.html

Vol. 37.1

324

Vol. 37.1

McGinty described Rice’s death as “a perfect storm of human error,”50 and
while this may very well be true, the same could not be said of the grand jury that
he led. McGinty was under no obligation to carry out grand jury proceedings, and
in fact, electing to do so only to recommend no charges undermines the very
purpose. He could have, just as easily called a press conference and announced
that no charges would be brought for the same reasons that he recommended as
much to the jury. There is no human error here, but only human intention. Why he
bothered with a grand jury rather than a press conference alone is unclear. But the
results are palpable. Prosecutors have the power to decide who is and is not being
hauled into court, and they want us to know that they do not second guess police
officers.
Certainly, there are many reasons why a grand jury might not indict, or a
prosecutor might not bring charges against, a police officer. The facts of the grand
juries described above, while full of unusual behavior by the prosecutors’ offices,
certainly explain why those grand jury did not indict. In so doing, the members of
those jury behaved as would be expected from the statistics listed above. But what
explains these statistics?
There are a litany of potential factors that might explain why charges are
not brought against police officers. There is potential juror bias, jurors favoring
the testimony of police officers about what kinds of behavior is justified;
prosecutorial bias, prosecutorial bias, prosecutors, whether consciously or
unconsciously, presenting a weaker case to a grand jury in order to protect the

50

Jamil Smith, The Tamir Rice Rule, (December 29, 2015),
https://newrepublic.com/article/126737/tamir-rice-rule

325

Vol. 37.1

working relationship between the police department and prosecutor’s office; and
public pressure, bringing a case to a grand jury, rather than a preliminary hearing
before a judge, as a means of responding to the public, and in so doing, presenting
a case that may not be fully formed.51 These factors are not mutually exclusive,
nor are they necessarily exhaustive, but they, collectively build to circumstances
in which prosecutors can respond to public pressures in a way that releases them
from potential backlash. Those who want a police officer charged are expected to
be satisfied with a prosecutor’s attempt to bring charges. Those who want no
charges brought are expected to be satisfied by the grand jury’s decision. Either
way, the decision has the appearance of being taken out of the hands of the
prosecutor.
In the instances when police are indicted, they are still convicted and
incarcerated at considerably lower rates than those of the general population.
According to data compiled by the Bureau of Justice, when police officers are
indicted and formally charged with crimes, only 33% of those charges result in
conviction, as opposed to the 66% conviction rate for the general population. In
the cases when police officers are convicted, only 12% actually face
incarceration, compared to the 48% rate of incarceration for convictions of
members of the general public. 5253 Prosecutorial discretion clearly factors into the
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lack of charges against police officers. How much it factors into conviction and
sentencing is an open question, but one that need not be answered at this time. It
is fruitless to delve into how to convict police officers when it is so difficult
already to indict them.

VII.

WHY CIVIL LAWSUITS FAIL TO DELIVER JUSTICE
Prosecutors are just not doing enough to hold police officers accountable

when suspects or civilians do not survive their police interactions. But our legal
system allows people to seek justice in other ways, largely through financial
compensation. In some instances, family survived by those killed by police
officers do bring wrongful death cases against the department, city or state in
question. Of course, as civil lawsuits, there is no risk of prison time for the
accused police officer, and so the burden of proof is considerably lower than in a
criminal proceeding. But are they effective at halting police violence?
Rather than evaluate the specific awards or settlements given in these
lawsuits, this Article will focus on some of the specifics surrounding the July
2014 death of Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York City. Garner was
questioned by police on accusations of illegally selling loose cigarettes and when
he became agitated, several police officers detained him. This altercation has been
caught on tape and is widely available to watch on the internet. 54 In the video, one
of the police officers, Daniel Pantaleo, clearly wraps his arm around Garner’s
neck in order to bring him to the ground. When Garner is on the ground, he
repeatedly says, “I can’t breathe,” until passing out. He was later pronounced
54
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dead, ruled a homicide through compression of his neck.55 Daniel Pantaleo was
then faced with a grand jury that declined to indict him for Garner’s death.
Garner’s family filed a wrongful death lawsuit against New York City, which was
released in a settlement for $5.9 million, which did not include any admission of
fault in Garner’s death by Pantaleo, the NYPD, New York City, or New York
State.56
This settlement has been criticized by police officers, including the head
of the Sergeants Benevolent Association police union, calling it “obscene,”
“shameful,” and an injustice for New York taxpayers, on the basis that a jury
would have awarded significantly lower amount, if anything at all.57 Garner’s
family, while accepting the settlement, made it clear that they did not believe
justice had been served, with one of Garner’s children recounting that "Justice is
when somebody is held accountable for what they do."58
These reactions get exactly to the core of why civil lawsuits after police
violence is just not justice. While the criticism from the police could be fairly
characterized as ignoring the significance of Garner’s death on a national scale, it
raises a strong point in terms of who is picking up the bill. In these wrongful
death suits, the city, or state, is the party with the ability to pay damages, not the
individual police officer in question. Therefore, whether winning a lawsuit or
55
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accepting a settlement, the only way a family can recover anything is at the
taxpayers’ expense. This might be acceptable if the citizenry had direct control
over policing practices and could proactively alter police practices immediately
after being dealt such a financial blow, but that is not the case in New York City
or anywhere. This raises the other point: in what sense is Daniel Pantaleo being
held accountable for his actions? He has no obligation to make any payments to
Garner’s family. While the Department of Justice has announced it would be
investigating the case, there has been no public announcement on the progress of
this investigation since it was begun in January 2015, and it is unclear, and in this
Author’s opinion, unlikely, that charges will be brought. 59 The worst case
scenario for Pantaleo could be a loss of his job, which is in no way commensurate
with Garner’s loss of his life60
The further question has yet to be addressed: do these kinds of lawsuits
cause police officers to behave any differently? Is the violence tempered? This
settlement was announced in July of 2015. From August 1 to December 31 of
2015, there were 418 people shot and killed by police across the United States.61
Five of these people were killed in New York State. During all of 2015, 18 people
were killed by police in New York State. Whether or not the public attention of
Garner’s death and settlement for Garner’s family is responsible for these
59
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numbers in New York is unclear. Across the nation, however, it is apparent that
there has been no clear decrease in police related fatalities. Regardless, however,
even if such a decrease could be shown, would that be an acceptable public policy
to forward? Should we live in a country in which the acceptable way to prevent
police violence is to wait until a case becomes egregious enough to justify 7
figure settlements in every state and then to let the effect of such financial losses
lead to a decrease in violence? How many will die in the meantime?

VIII.

THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION
AND PROSECUTION
The sheer number of incidents in which police officers kill citizens in the

line of duty suggests a problem, in and of itself. When looked at in relation to the
number of incidents in which police officers are killed and the rate at which police
officers are indicted, convicted and incarcerated, it is nothing short of an
epidemic, that shows prosecutors are failing to hold police officers accountable.
The only alternative is to presume that in the vast majority of cases, police
officers are entirely justified in the use of lethal force, even fewer than 130 police
officers have died in the line of duty during 2015, almost 8 times as many were so
fearful for their lives to justify lethal force. It requires believing that in at least 93
instances, police were so justified when faced with an unarmed person.62
Typically, proposals to help control the abuses of justice that can result
from prosecutorial discretion focus on plea bargaining and discriminatory
charging. Interesting, and potentially useful, proposals have included judicial
review of charging decisions, to as to have an early chance to challenge charges
62
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as discriminatory, as well as creating standards for plea bargaining to create more
consistent and, downright, fair results from these bargaining agreements. 63 While
these proposals would support the rights afforded to the accused, they would do
nothing to affect those who, for whatever reason, avoid even the accusation. In
fact, similar proposals to require prosecution in certain instances would prove
unworkable, as explained above.
The only viable solutions to the problems of police violence is to actually
punish police officers for their bad behavior. But, because prosecutors have
demonstrated an unwillingness to prosecute police officers, the only realistic
solutions would have to include removing such decisions from the hands of
prosecutors. Some might criticize this viewpoint as extreme, claiming that the
number of police officers facing charges in 2015 is a significant increase over the
previous rates. However, this argument is a clear failure. While it is true that the
rates of charges being brought has increased, and has even increased by a 3, from
about 5 per year up to 15, as of November 2015, this is simply not enough to
deliver justice.64 Even with the threefold increase, the raw numbers are simply not
enough. There are others who have engaged in tracking police related deaths
using different criteria than that of the Washington Post, and have reported
numbers upwards of 1,200.65 By any metric used to track these death, this
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amounts to less than 2% of police related fatalities having charges brought against
officers. Further, these 15 instances do not all correspond to incidences which
occurred during 2015. As referenced above, many grand jury proceedings do not
begin until months, and sometimes years after the potential crime has been
committed. Of 2015 incidents, only 7 cases led to charges.66 Even if we, as a
society, are to grant that police officers are best equipped to assess dangerous
situations and to decide when force is appropriate, would we also have to accept
that when police officers are responsible for, potentially, 1,000 deaths, that we
should not second guess them more than 98% percent of the time?
Further, were the argument to have teeth that the current increase in
charges is sufficient, the cause of this increase must be evaluated. In a vacuum,
one might assume that a threefold increase in charges would correspond to a
threefold increase of incidences of police related killings. This is simply not true,
however. While the Washington Post has only begun to compile data beginning in
2015, other sources have been doing so for further back. One source, Killed By
Police, suggests that in 2014, 1,111 people were killed by police and in 2013, 771
were killed.67 As noted above, the FBI does compile data that is entirely
voluntarily reported by police departments, and leads to numbers in the range of
300-450 per year. Of course, all of this is regardless of the fact that only 7 of the
15 officers charged in 2015 were in relation to events that occurred within 2015.
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Even if a threefold increase in rates of police related killings were found to exist,
which available data does not support, the adjusted rate of charges brought for
2015 would not reflect that increase.
What else, then, might be the reason for the above average rate of
charges? One possibility may be footage. While the Cook County Attorney
absolutely rejected that charges for the killer of Laquan McDonald, in Chicago,
had anything to do with the, at the time, forthcoming release of footage of the
shooting, it is worth considering that because of the combination of pushes for
police body cameras, the use of dash board cameras, citizens equipped
smartphones, and security cameras, more and more incidents of police violence
are being caught on tape.68 Some would suggest that the availability of this type
of footage is the only thing at all influencing the decisions to prosecute. 69 It is
difficult to say how great of an affect this is having on prosecutors, due to the
likely political ramifications of saying that public availability of these videos is
what is leading to charges, rather than the duty to seek justice. But, to suggest that
video has had no effect whatsoever strikes this Author as disingenuous.
Another possibility for this increase might have to do with the increased
levels of unrest resulting out of police related deaths. Since Michael Brown’s
death in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014, there have been demonstrations across the
country, largely led by the Black Lives Matter movement, demanding justice for
68
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those killed by police. Characterized both as protests and as riots, these
demonstrations have been met with both significant media attention and
considerable police action. While, just as with footage, it is unlikely that a
prosecutor would admit that charges have been brought against a police officer
because of protest, rather than for the pursuit of justice, it is clear that some
sections of public discourse have adjusted and will no longer be silent in response
to police violence. Again, to discount the effect of these demonstrations on the
behavior of prosecutors appears disingenuous.
But, while public pressure could certainly justify why a prosecutor
chooses to focus on murders rather than petty thefts, such public pressure is
inexcusable as the sole reason for prosecuting a police officer. The duty to seek
justice must include holding accountable police officers whose actions have
unnecessary lethal consequences, regardless of if there is a protest at the site of
the shooting or if there is publicly available footage of unjustifiable behavior.
Fortunately, there is another system that can be implemented.
Rather than leave these decisions in the hands of regular prosecutors, who
have failed to act to solve the problem of police violence, someone else must be
given the task. In order to do this, there must be independent review, from state
agencies, that are not dependent upon police cooperation for the regular course of
their work, and who would not be subject to reelection due to dissatisfaction from
the public. There is one federal bill, currently under review by the House
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations that
could help to solve this problem: the Police Training and Independent Review Act
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of 2015. The bill would require that any state in receipt of federal funding to assist
in law enforcement to institute both specialized training related to cultural
diversity, racial biases and how to safely interact with the mentally ill or else risk
loss of up to 20% of such funding. But more importantly, it would require such
states to have active laws that would support independent prosecution of members
of law enforcement or risk lose up to 20% of such funding.70 While this bill would
form a good start, it does not go far enough, as it fails to specify the nature and
extent of authority that such independent prosecution would have. While, if
passed into law, it is a near certainty that most states would enact appropriate
legislation as to comply, there is little within the text of the bill to indicate how
effective those pieces of legislation would be. A better proposal could be built
upon the bare bones of the Police Training and Independent Review Act, one that
would elaborate on the type of legislation that would adequately satisfy the
provisions of the Act.71
What is truly needed is a series of Special Prosecutor’s Offices at the
individual state levels, or else a functional equivalent. Such offices must have the
authority to bring charges and prosecute those charges in an effective manner. In
order to do so, these offices must be sufficiently funded to employ personnel and
obtain other resources as necessary to fully investigate charges. While the current
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financial incentives of the Act are likely to guarantee compliance, the Act could,
and should, be further amended to provide additional funding for these agencies.72
Neither aspect, independent investigation nor independent prosecution, on
its own would be enough. Both must work in tandem to remove the possibility of
ineffective investigation due to reliance on the police to police themselves or
ineffective prosecution caused by the necessary working relationships between
police officers and prosecutors.
If one is unmoved by the data detailed above and believes that current
prosecutors are beginning to take action on their own, because of the increase in
charges in 2015, this Author has only the following to say: People are dying while
we wait for prosecutors to figure things out for themselves. Perhaps prosecutors
will come to a consensus and work actively to combat the problem of police
violence. But perhaps they will not. Perhaps they will conclude that we should not
second guess police officers. The only solution is to force them to do so.

IX.

CONCLUSIONS
Police officers are a necessary aspect of society. Because of the access to

firearms in the United States, it is necessary for police officers to be equipped
with firearms of their own, for the instances when they are faced with lethal force,
so that they may use lethal force to protect themselves or to protect the lives of
others. But, the manner in which America’s police are using this force is
unacceptable. The rates of police killing citizens is nearly 8 times higher than the
rates of police dying in the line of duty.
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Nonetheless, they have been afforded protections by the only agents of
government with the authority to hold them accountable. Prosecutors
continuously fail to bring charges against police officers because of political
pressures and maintenance of a work relationship. As a result, the police are
unrestrained and our citizens are unprotected. These results confound on one
another, as a lack of police officers being charged reinforces the idea that police
are more likely than not justified in the lethal use of force. The fewer charges are
brought, the more political pressure there is for prosecutors to not bring charges.
This system is unworkable and inhumane.
Prosecutors have broad discretion, and they need this discretion to do their
jobs. But prosecutors also play to win. They do not call grand juries unless they
expect indictment or unless they want to relieve pressure placed upon them. They
do not try cases they expect to lose. And they do not bring charges with political
costs. Prosecutors play to win, but their discretion lets them make the rules, and
these rules favor police officers who kill rather than those killed by the police.
This power must be taken away from prosecutors, and put in the hands of
people with nothing to lose from disgruntling police departments. Police officers
are meant to be the guardians of our society, and prosecutors the ones responsible
for guarding us from them. They have failed to do so, and so, we now need
watchmen willing, and able, to do the job.

